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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 4, 2001, President Bush authorized the National
Security Agency (NSA) to collect two different types of bulk
information: telephony and Internet metadata, and telephone and
Internet content. The former gave the NSA the ability to identify
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law. This Article constitutes the third seetion of a three-
part series on NSA surveillance under FISA. See Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y (2014);
Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet
Content (2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=243648.
1 Authorization for Specified Electronic Surveillance Activities During a Limited Period to
Detect and Prevent Acts of Terrorism Within the United States, Oct. 4, 2001, cited in
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY
SERVICE, WORKING DRAFT ST-09-ooo2(Mar. 24, 2009)1, 7-8, 11, 15, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-inspector-general-
report-document-data-collection [hereinafter WORKING DRAFT]; The Obama
Administration has publicly confirmed the inclusion of Internet and telephony metadata,
and telephony content, as part of the President's Surveillance Program (PSP), but not
Internet content. See Press Release, Director of National Intelligence, (DNI) Announces
the Declassification of the Existence of Collection Activities Authorized by President
George W. Bush Shortly After the Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Dec. 21, 2013), available
at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/991-
dni -announces-the-declassification-of-the -exisitence-ofcollection- activities -authorized-
by-president-george-w-bush-shortly-after-the-attacks-of-september-11, 2001 [hereinafter
Declassification Press Release]; Unclassified Declaration of Frances J. Fleisch, National
Security Agency, Jewel v. NSA, No. 08-ev-4373-JSW (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2013), available
at https://www.eff.org/files/2013/12/21/fleisch2ol3jewelshubert.pdf (using language
identical to DNI press release)[hereinafter Fleisch Declaration]. See also OLC-132,
Memorandum from a Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel to
the counsel to the President, regarding a request from the White House for OLC's views
regarding what legal standards might govern the use of certain intelligence methods to
monitor communications by potential terrorists, Oct. 4, 2001, noted by Second Redacted
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terrorist-related activity through contact chaining-i.e., the process of
building a network graph that modeled communication patterns of
targets and their associates2-he latter provided raw intelligence.3
Within a month, the President's Surveillance Program (PSP), renewed
thereafter at 30-60 day intervals, became operational.4
Over the next twelve years, the contours of-and the legal basis
for-the classified program and its component parts shifted. The
Administration initially grounded PSP in the President's Article II
Commander-in-Chief authorities, the 2001 Authorization for the Use
of Military Force (AUMF), and the War Powers Resolution.!
Gradually, key portions of the program were either eliminated or
moved to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).6 Critical
statutory changes contributed to the process.7 Despite these changes,
Declaration of Steven G. Bradbury, Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Justice, 511 F. Supp. 2d
56 (D.D.C. 2007), available at
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/aclu-v-duj-2nd-declaration-stev
en bradbury.pdf.
2 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 13.
3 Id. at 15.
4 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 11 ("Within 30 days, the PSP was fully
operational... .Private sector partners began to send telephony and Internet content to NSA
in October 2001. They began to send telephony and Internet metadata to NSA as early as
November 2001").
5 See, e.g., President's Radio Address, THE WHITE HOUSE, Dee. 17, 2005, available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html;
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITYAGENCY DESCRIBED BYTHE PRESIDENT (Jan. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf; Letter from William E.
Moschella, Assistant Attorney General to The Hon. Pat Roberts, Chair, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, The Hon. John D. Rockefeller, Vice Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, The Hon. Peter Hoekstra, Chairman, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, and the Hon. Jane Harman,
Ranking Minority Member, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of
Representatives (Dec. 22, 2005), available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/dojl222o5.pdf.
6 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436,
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (2006). See also discussion, Part II, infra.
7 See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 553. (Aug. 5, 2007)
(amending FISA, § 1o5B(a)(1)-(5)), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 18o5b (2oo6)); FISA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (July 10, 2008).
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calls for reform of FISA persisted.8 For the most part, however, they
met with little success.
It was not until Edward Snowden's releases, in June 2013 et seq.,
the court-ordered release of documents in a Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) case, and the declassification of additional documents by
the Obama Administration, that calls for significant reform took hold.9
With FISA considered by Congress to be the sole means via which
intelligence agencies could collect information on U.S. persons within
the United States, attention was drawn to the legal sufficiency of the
programs under the statute and the First and Fourth Amendments,
and ways in which the legislative language could be altered to take
account of new and emerging technologies, the needs of the
intelligence community, civil liberties, and citizens' constitutional
right to privacy. Dozens of reform initiatives are now on the table. The
Administration has indicated a willingness to work with Congress to
alter the statutory framing, and the legislature is poised to take up the
issue of FISA reform.
What has been missing from the discussion is a comprehensive
view of ways in which reform could be given effect-i.e., a taxonomy of
potential reform efforts. This Article seeks to fill the gap. The aim is to
deepen the conversation about potential approaches to foreign
intelligence gathering, to allow fuller discussion of what a
comprehensive reform package could contain, and to place specific
reforms that are currently being advocated within a broader, over-
arching framework.
The Article begins by addressing (to the extent that the
information is publicly available) the legal underpinnings of PSP and
8 For thoughtful and important contributions to FISA reform following the FAA, see
William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88
TEXAS L. REV. 1633 (2010); David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act: Progress to Date and Work Still to Come, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON
TERROR: AN AGENDA FOR REFORM, 217 (Benjamin Wittes, ed., 2009); Richard A. Posner,
Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 (2OO8); Orin S. Kerr, Updating the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 75 U. CHI. L. REv. 225 (2010); Paul M. Schwartz,
Reviving Telecommunications Surveillance Law, U. CHI. L. REv. 287 (2OO8).
9 See, e.g., Elec. Frontier Found. v Dep't of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR (N.D. Cal.
2013); Declassification Press Release, supra note 1. See also Aamer Madhani, DNI
Releases More Documents to Justify NSA Surveillance, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 2013,
http://wwv.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2o13/12/21/dni-nsa-documents-bulk-
data/4157877/ ("In the face of growing skepticism over the National Security Agency's
practice of collecting bulk phone and Internet records, the director of national intelligence
on Saturday declassified several documents detailing the program. The latest
declassification of documents comes during a week in which a federal judge ruled the
NSA's bulk collection was likely unconstitutional and a White House task force questioned
the effectiveness of the program.").
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its progeny. It outlines the components of the original program and
their transfer to FISA. Part II ends with an overview of the state of
play with regard to current calls for reform.
Part III focuses on how technology has altered the types of
information available, as well as methods of transmission and storage.
It suggests that we now find ourselves in a world in which five primary
types of information are available: personal, transactional, relational,
locational, and content. Set against the five categories are six methods
of access, transmission, and storage: audio/visual observation,
communications networks, papers, hard drives and independent
electronic devices, remote servers and cloud technologies, and social
media. The purpose of this discussion is to step back from how foreign
intelligence has traditionally been conceived, to consider the world as
we now find it.
Part IV builds on the previous section by developing a taxonomy
for how a statutory approach to foreign intelligence gathering could be
given force. It divides foreign intelligence gathering into two
categories: front-end collection and back-end analysis and use. Each
category contains a counterpoise structured to ensure the appropriate
exercise of Congressionally-mandated authorities. For the front-end,
this means balancing the manner of collection with requirements for
approval. For the back-end, this means offsetting implementation
with transparency and oversight.
The taxonomy sub-divides for both parts of each category. The
first half of the front-end framework, the manner of collection,
proposes six sections. The first two divisions draw from Part III,
emphasizing (1) the disparate types of information available and (2)
distinct methods of access, transmission, and storage. To this are
added (3) the form in which information is transferred, (4) the agency
obtaining the information, (5) the target about whom information is
sought, (6) the source of the data, and (7) the location of the material.
The second half of the front-end framework, requirements for
approval, looks at four areas: (1) the entity approving the collection of
information, (2) how this entity is constructed, (3) the scope of the
approval, (4) verification, and (5) potential emergency exceptions.
Turning to the back-end framework, the Article addresses
implementation as manifest through (1) analysis, (2) use, (3)
retention, and (4) transfer of information. The second half of the back-
end, transparency and oversight, emphasizes (1) who reports, (2) what
is reported, (3) to whom such reports are made, (4) penalties for
violations, and (5) alternative reporting channels.
Part V concludes by noting that the purpose of building the
typology is to provide a framework for different considerations to be
taken into account in constructing a comprehensive reform package.
This Article does not take a substantive position on the categories put
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forward. Instead, it identifies potential ways to proceed in developing
an approach to foreign intelligence gathering that is cognizant of new
and emerging technologies, as well as other, competing needs, such as
intelligence gathering, threat assessments, economic stability, civil
liberties, the right to privacy, and protections against the misuse of
information.
II. LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS
From the beginning, information about the existence of, and the
legal basis for, the PSP was tightly controlled.0 Subjected to broader
scrutiny, PSP's legal grounding altered. Eventually, the constituent
portions of PSP were either eliminated or transferred to FISA's
overarching framework. As more information became public,
statutory and constitutional concerns emerged. Central to the debate
has been the sufficiency of the existing statutory language in light of
new and emerging technologies and the First and Fourth Amendment
implications of the current programs. Resultantly, calls for reform are
gaining ground.
A. The President's Surveillance Program and its Transfer to FISA
In March 2004, a classified review of the program by the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) determined that there was legal support for three
of the four types of collection included in PSP: (a) bulk telephony
metadata, and the contents of (b) telephone and (c) Internet
communications. OLC found that, in contrast to the three programs,
the bulk Internet metadata collection appeared to be prohibited by the
terms of FISA and Title III." Based on OLC's finding, President
George W. Bush rescinded the authority to collect bulk Internet
10 See, e.g., WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 22 ("As directed by the White House, access
to the original Presidential authorization and subsequent renewals was tightly
controlled."); Id. at 21 (noting that 'The NSA did not have access to the early DO3 Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions supporting the Attorney General's statement that the PSP
was legal."); Memorandum from George W. Bush, the White House, to the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation of
Investigation, Re: Disclosures to the Congress (Oct. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/gwbioo50i.html (directing members of the Cabinet to limit
any disclosures to Congress regarding classified or sensitive law enforcement information
to the Gang of Eight). See also WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 25 (noting briefings only
to the Gang of Eight).
11 OLC apparently issued three opinions on this matter: Mar. 15, 2004, May 6, 2004, and
July i6, 2004. WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 37.
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metadata and gave the NSA one week to terminate the program.
Department of Justice and the NSA subsequently transferred the
process to FISA's Pen Register/Trap and Trace Provisions (PR'Yr),
with the first order approved July 14, 2007 and renewed thereafter at
90-day intervals. 2 The program appears to have operated until
December 2011, when it was discontinued for failure to deliver
sufficient operational value to the NSA. 3
The three remaining PSP programs reviewed by OLC (bulk
telephony metadata, and the contents of international telephone and
Internet communications) appear to have been known only to a small
number of people within the executive branch. It was not until a New
York Times article was published in December 2005 that their
existence reached the public domain. 4 At that time, only a narrow
part of PSP emerged: the NSA's interception of (at least some)
telephone content between the United States and overseas." Some
months later, the media reported further on the collection of domestic
telephony metadata. 16
Pressed in late 2005 and early 20o6 for the legal rationale behind
the interception of international communications, a program that the
Administration referred to as the Terrorism Surveillance Program
(TSP), the government cited the President's constitutional authorities
12 WORKING DRAr, supra note 1, at 38, 39; Declassification Press Release, supra note 1;
Fleisch Declaration, supra note 1.
13 See Declassification Press Release, supra note 1; Fleisch Declaration, supra note 1.
14 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/i6program.html?pagewanted=all&_r=o
("Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the National
Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search
for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-approved warrants ordinarily required
for domestic spying, according to government officials."). See also Eric Lichtblau and
James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2005, http://www.nytimes.Com/2005/12/24/politiCs/24spy.html?pagewanted=all ("The
National Security Agency has traced and analyzed large volumes of telephone and Internet
communications flowing into and out of the United States as part of the eavesdropping
program that President Bush approved after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to hunt for evidence
of terrorist activity, according to current and former government officials.").
15 Lichtblau and Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, supra note 14.
16 Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database ofAmericans'Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May
11, 2oo6, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2oo6-0510-
nsa x.htm. See also Seymour M. Hersh, Listening In, NEWYORKER, May 29, 20o6,
available at http://vww.newyorker.om/archiva/2oo6/o5/29/o6o529ta talk-hersh.
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as Commander-in-Chief, the 2001 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force (AUMF), and the War Powers Resolution (WPR).I7
Congress and others offered three principal legal objections. First,
that the legislature had intended the 1978 Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, which restricted electronic surveillance and required
judicial approval for the granting of orders, to be the sole means via
which the executive branch could conduct domestic surveillance for
foreign intelligence and international counter-terrorism purposes. 8
FISA contemplated the advent of war, allowing a 15-day grace period,
at the expiration of which the statute's provisions would be in effect.' 9
Second, while the AUMF gave the President the authority to "use
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks," neither the legislative
history nor the text of the 2001 AUMF made explicit reference to
electronic surveillance.20
Third, Congress (and the Courts) had previously considered and
declined to recognize claims to Article II authority to conduct foreign
17 See, e.g., President's Radio Address, THE WHITE HOUSE, Dec. 17, 2005, available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051217.html;
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 5; Letter from William E. Mosehella, supra note 5.
18 During passage of FISA, some members of the House of Representatives wanted the
statute to read that it was the "exclusive statutory" means for the Executive to conduct
electronic surveillance, implying in the process that the President had inherent surveillance
powers outside the statute. The Senate rejected this notion, suggesting that if the President
were to engage in electronic surveillance outside the parameters of FISA, on judicial
review, they wanted the Supreme Court to treat the President's actions as under Justice
Jackson's third category in Youngstown: against the expressed intent of Congress. The
Senate view carried. See 50 U.S.C. §1811 et seq.
19 50 U.S.C. §1811 (2006) (electronic surveillance); 50 U.S.C. §1829 (2oo6) (physical
search), 50 U.S.C. §1844 (2oo6) (pen/trap) ("Notwithstanding any other law, the
President, through the Attorney General, may authorize [electronic surveillance, physical
search, or pen/trap] to acquire foreign intelligence information for a period not to exceed
15 calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress."). It provided for a 15-day
grace period, to "allow time for consideration of any amendment to [FISA] that may be
appropriate during a wartime emergency." H.R. REP. NO. 95-172o, at 34 (1978) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4o63. At the expiry of the 15 days, absent any
amendment, ordinary FISA provisions would have to be followed. Congress recognized that
this had been a carefully-constructed compromise position: during the debates on FISA,
the House of Representatives had sought a complete abatement of FISA during periods of
declared war. The Senate objected, and the House of Representatives changed its position.
2 0 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
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intelligence gathering within domestic bounds absent a warrant-this
had been the basis on which FISA had been introduced.2'
In the face of mounting public pressure, a company providing
telephony metadata expressed concern to the NSA about the voluntary
nature of the program, requesting that the process be, instead, one of
government compulsion.2 Resultantly, on May 24, 2006, the NSA
transferred the bulk collection of telephony metadata to FISA's
tangible goods provisions in Section 501 (as amended by USA
PATRIOT Act Section 215).23
The remaining PSP collection programs, which focused on
international telephone and Internet content, could not so easily be
transferred to FISA.24 To do so, DOJ and NSA would have to find a
legal theory to support the NSA's addition and withdrawal of
thousands of foreign targets for content collection.5
The solution ultimately turned on a new definition of "facility"-no
longer would it be understood in relation to a particular telephone
number or email address, but instead, it became defined in a manner
that included general gateways used for communications.26 In January
21 In 1972, the Court held that government officials were obliged to obtain a warrant prior
to electronic surveillance, even where domestic security might be on the line. The court
cited the "inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept" and the potential for abuse
and the targeting of political dissenters, to underscore the importance of Fourth
Amendment protections. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
2 2 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 39-40.
23 USA PATRIOT Act, See. 215, amending FISA See. 501, codified at 50 USC §1861 (Access
to certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism
investigations). For the original order for Verizon, see In re Application of the Fed. Bureau
of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from
[Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No. BR-05 (FISA Ct.
May 24, 20o6), available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docketo6-
05-ldec2ol redacted.ex - ocr o.pdf (released by court order as part of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation's FOIA litigation). Note that the specific telecommunications
company from which such records were sought were redacted, as well as the remaining
title; however, the government also released an NSA report that provided more detail on
the title of the Order. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT'L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV.,
ST-o6-ooi8, REPORT ON THE ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER: TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS
(Sept. 5, 2oo6) (see page 94 of 1846 and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2oo9), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub Feb%2o12%202009%2oMemorandum
%200f%2oUS.pdf.
24 Telephone content collection came to be known as the Terrorism Surveillance Program.
2 5 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 40.
26 WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 41.
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2007, FISC approved the new theory with regard to foreign selectors
but rejected it for the domestic realm, signing two separate orders.27
The former change immediately and negatively affected the
number of foreign selectors that could be used with regard to
collection.28 It also placed a higher administrative burden on the NSA.
In April 2007, the Director of National Intelligence, J.M. McConnell,
submitted a proposal to Congress to amend FISA to make it easier for
the executive branch to target U.S. interests abroad.
Four months later, Congress passed the Protect America Act
(PAA), easing restrictions on the surveillance of foreigners where one
(or both) parties were located overseas.29 The statute removed the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) from supervising the
interception of communications that began or ended in a foreign
country. In its place, the Attorney General and the Director of
National Intelligence could authorize, up to one year, the acquisition
of communications concerning "persons reasonably believed to be
outside the United States," where five criteria were met. 0 The PAA
required the Attorney General to submit the targeting procedures to
FISC and to certify that the communications to be intercepted were
not purely domestic in nature."' Once certified, FISC was required to
27 Foreign Content Order, Jan. 10, 2007 and Domestic Content Order, Jan. 10, 2007, cited
in WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 41-42. For additional sources noting the ending of PSP
in January 2007 see also S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 4 (2007); Letter from Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and Senator
Arlen Specter (Jan. 17, 2007). Other documents, however, suggest that TSP transitioned to
FISA in January 2007. See, e.g., Declassification Press Release, supra note i; Fleisch
Declaration, supra note 1.
28 Unlike the Foreign Content Order, the Domestic Content Order issued by FISC in
January 2007 did not have an immediate, dramatic impact on collection. Nevertheless, it
retarded the process to the point where, by January 2009, only a single selector was
directed towards collection. The FBI subsequently took responsibility for the domestic
order before the FISC. WORKING DRAFT, supra note 1, at 42.
29 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 553 (Aug. 5, 2007)
(amending FISA, § 105B(a)(1)-(5)), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 18o5b (2006)).
30 1. Reasonable procedures were in place for determining that the acquisition concerned
persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; 2. The acquisition did
not constitute electronic surveillance (i.e., it did not involve solely domestic
communications); 3. The acquisition involved obtaining the communications data from or
with the assistance of a communications service provider who had access to
communications; 4. A significant purpose of the acquisition was to obtain foreign
intelligence information; and 5. Minimization procedures outlined in the FISA would be
used. Id.
31 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 3, 121 Stat. 552 (Aug. 5, 2007)
(amending FISA § 105B(c), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 18o5c (2006).
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grant the order.32 Intended to operate for six months, the PAA gave
retroactive immunity to service providers to insulate them from civil
liability.33
Congress continued the PAA until February 17, 2oo8, 3  eventually
replacing it with a more permanent measure: the FISA Amendments
Act (FAA).35 Consistent with this statute, FISA Section 702 empowers
the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence jointly
to authorize, for up to one year, "the targeting of persons reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States to acquire foreign
intelligence information.' 6 FISC annually reviews the certification for
the order, to which certain limitations apply.37 The FAA also brought
the targeting of U.S. persons overseas, previously addressed via
32 Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 4, 121 Stat. 552 (Aug. 5, 2007)
(amending FISA § 105C). Twice a year the Attorney General would be required to inform
the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate of incidents or
noncompliance with the directive issued by the Attorney General or Director of National
Intelligence, incidents of noncompliance with FISC-approved procedures, and the numbers
of certifications or directives issued during the reporting period. Id.
33 Protect America Act of 2007, §6.
34 Various bills were proposed in the interim. See, e.g., FISA Amendments Act of 2008, S.
2248, iioth Cong. (2007).
35 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (July 10, 2008).
36 "Procedures for Targeting Certain Persons Outside the United States Other Than United
States Persons," Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat.
2436, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 18i (a) (2006). Except as otherwise noted, section 702
mirrors the definitions adopted in FISA for the terms "agent of a foreign power," "foreign
intelligence information," "foreign power," and "person.".
37 Five limitations apply to the order issued by the AG and DNI: first, it "may not
intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United
States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881b(i) (2006). Second, it "may not intentionally target a person
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such
acquisition is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United
States." § 1881b(2). Third, it "may not intentionally target a United States person
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States." § 1881b(3). Fourth, it "may
not intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended
recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States." §
1881b(4). Fifth, the collection of such information "shall be conducted in a manner
consistent with the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." §
1881b(5). In exigent circumstances, the Attorney General and the DNI may authorize an
immediate acquisition under Section 702; however, they must then submit a certification
to the FISC as soon as practicable, but in no event later than seven days after they
determined the existence of such exigent circumstances. § 188ib.
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Section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333, within FISA, providing greater
protections for U.S. persons.38
B. Reform Efforts
The Snowden releases in June 2013 et seq. set off a storm of
criticism of the NSA's use of its authorities under FISA and the FAA.39
Forced on the defensive, the Obama Administration responded by
declassifying FISC orders, targeting and minimization procedures,
and other documents.40 Freedom of Information Act litigation
initiated by the Electronic Frontier Foundation contributed further to
the amount of information in the public domain, resulting during
autumn 2013 in the monthly release of previously classified
materials.4'
Cases challenging the legality of these programs are working their
way through the courts. Some, directed at FISC, seek to obtain more
information about the programs currently underway.42 Others focus
38 The FAA required, for instance, that the government adopt targeting and minimization
procedures for review by FISC. The minimization procedures, in particular, restrict
handling information concerning U.S. persons incidentally acquired under Section 702-
including the retention and dissemination of such information. Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a)
(2006).
39 For a relatively complete list of key media reports and the Administration's response, see
NSA Documents Released to the Public Since June 2013, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-publie-june-2013.
40 Documents declassified by the Administration (both voluntarily and as a result of FOIA
litigation) are located at Office of the Director of National Intelligence, IC on the Record,
available at http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/.
41 The Section 215 documents were released in three batches on September 10, 2013,
October 28, 2013, and November 19, 2013. They are archived at Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF), Transparency Project, Section 215 of the USA PATRIOTAct, located at
https://www.eff.org/foia/section-215-usa-patriot-act. Further FOIA disclosures from EFF
lawsuits related to Section 702 and an opinion of FISC from Oct. 3, 2011, which were
released Aug. 21, 2013, are located at https://www.eff.org/foia/fisc-orders-illegal-
government-sureveillance.
42 See, e.g., ACLU's Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-02 (FISA
Ct. 2013); Yahoo's Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc 13-05 (FISA
Ct. 2013) (challenging the classification of secret court documents); Google's Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-03 (FISA Ct. 2013); Microsoft's
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No.Misc. 13-04 (FISA Ct. 2013)
(challenging the classification of secret court data); Facebook's Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-06 (FISA Ct. 2013); Yahoo's second Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-05 (FISA Ct. 2013); LinkedIn's
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on the statutory and constitutional questions.43 It appears that, for
now, the Supreme Court is content to let the cases work their way
through the lower CoUrtS. 44 It is too early to tell how these suits will
progress-not least because of difficult issues related to standing,
jurisdiction, and Supreme Court precedent. What is clear is that the
programs are highly contentious, with the circuits, just nine months
into the process, already divided.45
Many observers suggest that the best solution to the lack of clarity
surrounding the intelligence community's authority to use new and
emerging technologies to collect digital information is to amend the
current statutory framework governing foreign intelligence and
international counterterrorism investigations. Towards these ends, in
2013 Congress held numerous hearings, 46 and members of both
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-07 (FISA Ct. 2013); SCLU's
second Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-08 (FISA Ct. 2013);
ProPublica's Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Motion, No. Misc. 13-09 (FISA Ct.
2013).
4 3 See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. 2013) (challenging
the Verizon Section 215 order); Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0851, 2013 WL 6571596 (D.D.C.
2013) (challenging the NSA's PRISM surveillance program conducted under FISA Section
702); ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-CV-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013) (challenging the Verizon
Section 215 order); Smith v. Obama, No. 2:13-CV-00257 (D. Idaho 2013) (challenging the
Verizon Section 215 order); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, No.
13-58, (U.S. 2013) (challenging the Section 215 Verizon order); First Unitarian Church v.
Nat'l Sec. Agency, No. 13-3287 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (challenging electronic surveillance).
44 See, e.g., In Re Electronic Privacy Information Center, No. 13-58 (U.S. 2013) (denying
petition for a writ of mandamus).
45 Compare, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-CV-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013) (Judge Pauley
rejection of government's argument that plaintiffs lack standing, rejection of plaintiffs'
claims under the Administrative Procedure Act; acceptance of government statutory
construction, and determination that Smith v. Maryland controls for Fourth Amendment
purposes) with Klayman v. Obama (Klayman I), No. 13-o881 (D.D.C. 2013); Klayman v.
Obama (Klayman II), No. 13-o851 (D.D.C. 2013), available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/9o1810-klaymanvobama215.html.
46 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on FISA, 113th Cong. (Dec. 11, 2013);
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Continued Oversight of U.S. Government
Surveillance Authorities, 113th Cong. (Dec. 10, 2013); Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing on NSA Spying, 113th Cong. (Nov. 21, 2013); Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing on Transparency Issues, 113th Cong. (Nov. 13, 2013); House Intelligence
Committee Hearing on FISA/NSA Program, 113th Cong. (Oct. 29, 2013); Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearing, 113th Cong. (Oct. 2, 2013); Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing,
113th Cong. (Sept. 26, 2013) (note classified/public sessions); Nomination of J. Patrick
Rowan to be Assistant Attorney General for National Security: Hearing of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, iioth Cong. (Sept. 25, 2008) (discussing Section 702);
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on NSA surveillance, 113th Cong. (July 31, 2013);
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Houses introduced dozens of bills centered on FISA reform.
Congress has begun 2014 in much the same manner.48
As these reform efforts have gained momentum, the Obama
Administration has indicated a willingness to amend the current law.
In September 2013 the President appointed a Review Group on
Intelligence and Communications Technologies. 49 Their final report,
How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans and Why Disclosure Aids our
Adversaries: House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 113th Cong. (June 18,
2013) (testimony of Gen. Keith Alexander, Deputy Atton'y Gen. James Cole, NSA Deputy
Dir. John Chris Inglis, FBI Deputy Dir. Sean Joyce, General Counsel Office of the Director
of National Intelligence Robert Litt); House Judiciary Committee Hearing on NSA
Programs, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013); Senate Appropriations Committee Hearing, 113th
Cong. (June 12, 2013) (testimony of Gen. Keith Alexander, Acting Deputy Homeland
Security Secretary Rand Beers; Acting Deputy Commerce Secretary Patrick Gallagher,
Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology; Richard McFeely, Exec.
Asst. Dir. of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation's Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services
Branch).
47 For comprehensive reform bills, see, e.g., USA Freedom Act, S.1599; FISA
Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1631, 113th Cong. (2013); FISA Accountability and Privacy
Protection Act Of 2013, S.1215, 113th Cong. (2013); LIBERT-E Act, H.R. 2399, 113th Cong.
(2013); A bill to modify the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 19789, S.1182, 113th
Cong. (2013); Restore Our PrivacyAct, S. 1168, 113th Cong. (2013); Fourth Amendment
Restoration Act of 2013, S.1121,113th Cong. (2013); RelevancyAct, H.R. 2603,113th Cong.
(2013); Surveillance State Repeal Act, H.R. 2818, 113th Cong. (2013); Telephone
Surveillance Accountability Act of 2013, H.R. 2684,113th Cong. (2013); Freedom and
PrivacyAct of 2013, S. 1701, 113th Cong. (2013). For bills addressing FISC reform see, e.g.,
FISA Court Judge Selection Reform Act of 2013, S.146o, 113th Cong. (2013); FISA Court
Reform Act of 2013, S.1467, 113th Cong. (2013); Presidential Appointment of FISA Court
Judges Act, H.R. 2761, 113th Cong. (2013); FISA Court AccountabilityAct, H.R. 2586,
113th Cong. (2013); PrivacyAdvocate General Act of 2013, H.R. 2849, 113th Cong. (2013);
FISA Court in the Sunshine Act of 2013, H.R. 2440, 113th Cong. (2013). For bills covering
other aspects of FISA reform see, e.g., Ending Secret Law Act S.113o/H.R. 2475, 113th
Cong. (2013); NSAAccountabilityAct, H.R. 3070, 113th Cong. (2013); Government
Surveillance TransparencyAct of 2013, H.R. 2736, 113th Cong. (2013); Surveillance Order
Reporting Act of 2013, H.R. 3035, 113th Cong. (2013); Surveillance TransparencyAct of
2013, S.1452, 113th Cong. (2013); National Whistleblower Appreciation Day, S. Res. 202,
113th Cong. (2013).
48 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on the Report of the President's Review
Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, 113th Cong. (Jan. 14, 2014);
Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing on National Security Threats, 113th Cong. (Jan.
29, 2014) (discussing section 215 and raising concerns about erroneous or misleading
statements from government officials during previous hearings on NSA surveillance);
House Judiciary Committee Hearing on Examining Recommendations to Reform FISA
Authorities, 113th Cong. (Feb. 4, 2014); Senate Judiciary Committee, Hearing on Privacy
in the DigitalAge: Preventing Data Breaches and Combating Cybercrime, 113th Cong.
(Feb. 4, 2014); House intelligence Committee, Hearing on World Wide Threats, 113th
Cong. (Feb. 4, 2014).
49 Press Release, Director of National Intelligence, DNI Clapper Announces Review Group
on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, Aug. 12, 2013, available at
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issued in December 2013, made forty-six recommendations that
incorporated a series of significant statutory reforms-including, inter
alia, an end to the current bulk collection of metadata, the insertion of
a constitutional advocate during FISC deliberations, and new limits on
and reporting requirements for government aplications under and
use of FISA sections 215, 402, and 702. The Review Group
recommended that future access to metadata be mediated by third
parties, with telecommunications providers, or other entities,
retaining the information, to which access could be granted only
through specific orders from FISC.5'
In December 2013, in hearings before the Senate, the Deputy
Attorney General, the Director of the NSA, and the NSA's General
Counsel issued a joint statement supporting limited reform of the
current system.
52
The following month, the President issued a new Presidential
Policy Directive (PPD-28), laying out the current principles guiding
SIGINT, such as the integration of privacy and civil liberties
considerations in the collection of intelligence, limits on the collection
of commercial information and trade secrets, and the tailoring of
SIGINT to areas where the information is not otherwise available.
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/909-
dni-clapper-announces-review-group-on-intelligence- and-communications -technologies.
Members of the Review Group included Richard A. Clarke, Michael J. Morell, Geoffrey R.
Stone, Cass R. Sunstein, and Peter Swire. The original press release called it the "Director
of National Intelligence Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies," with a directive to report to the President by December 15, 2013; However,
the final report, placed on the White House web site, is entitled "Report and
Recommendations of The President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies." REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg final-report.pdf
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP].
50 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP, supra note 49, at 24-30.
5'Id.
52 See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Continued Oversight of U.S.
Government Surveillance Authorities, 113th Cong. (Dec. 11, 2013) (testimony of Deputy
Attorney General James M. Cole, Director Keith B. Alexander and General Counsel Robert
S. Litt), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-
131211.html (stating, "we would be open to discussing legislation authorizing the FISA
Court to appoint an amicus, at its discretion, in appropriate cases, such as those that
present novel and significant questions of law and that involve the acquisition and
retention of information concerning a substantial number of U.S. persons.").
53 Presidential Policy Directive 28, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2, §1 (Jan. 17, 2014),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2o14/o/17/presidential-policy-
direcive-signals-intelligence-aciviies.
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The document restricts the use of bulk SIGINT data. 4 It draws
attention to the policies and procedures in place with regard to
minimization (both dissemination and retention of personal data),
data security and access, data quality, and oversight."5 PPD-28
announced the appointment of a Privacy and Civil Liberties official to
assist key parties in their development of policies and procedures, as
well as a coordinator for International Diplomacy to serve as a point of
contact with foreign governments wishing to raise concerns about U.S.
intelligence gathering. 6
In his speech accompanying issuance of the directive, the
President stated his intent to "reform the programs and procedures in
place to provide greater transparency to our surveillance activities and
fortify the safeguards that protect the privacy of U.S. persons."" For
the bulk collection program, this meant ordering a transition to end it
as it currently exists, and establishing an alternative collection
structure-potentially along the lines of that recommended by the
Review Group. To facilitate a transfer to a new system, the President
instructed the intelligence community to develop options for a new
approach, with a report due back to the President prior to FISC's
reauthorization consideration March 28, 2014."
The President's remarks and issuance of PPD-28 minimized but
did not eliminate the impact of the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) Section 215 report, which was slotted for
publication the following week. 9 That report made clear that the
54 Id., at § 2 (directing that the data be used "only for the purposes of detecting and
countering: (i) espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign powers or
their intelligence services against the United States and its interests; (2) threats to the
United States and its interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and its
interests from the development, possession, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass
destruction; (4) cybersecurity threats; (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other
U.S or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats, including illicit finance and
sanctions evasion related to the other purposes named in this section.").
55 Id. at § 4.
56 Id.
57 Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), in WASH.
POST, Jan. 17, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/polities/full-text-of-president-
obamas-jan-17-speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/o1/17/fa33590a- 7f8c- e3-9556-
4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html.
58Id.
59 PCLOB is an independent, bipartisan entity established by statute whose members are
appointed by the President. See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 801(a), 121 Stat. 266, 352-58 (2007).
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PCLOB considered the bulk collection of metadata to be illegal as both
a statutory and a constitutional matter. The 238-page document called
for an end to current program. Two of the board's five members
(Rachel L. Brand and Elisebeth Collins Cook, both of whom served in
the Department of Justice during the George W. Bush Administration)
supported modifications to the program to take account of privacy
concerns. The three remaining members (David Medine, who was a
Federal Trade Commission official during the Clinton Administration;
James X. Dempsey, a public policy specialist at the Center for
Democracy and Technology; and Patricia M. Wald, a former federal
appeals court judge nominated by President Jimmy Carter),
considered it necessary to end the program altogether.6"
Four days before the deadline, President Obama announced that,
notwithstanding a further, 90-day extension of the program, he
planned to ask Congress to end bulk collection altogether.6 In its
place, telephone companies will retain the records for the usual
amount of time, with the NSA only having access to particular records
with FISC approval.62
The President's proposal goes some way towards meeting
widespread criticism of the Section 215 program. It does not, however,
address either all of the critiques, nor does it affect the programs that
continue under Section 702.63 Part of the problem is that the
6 0 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 168-170, 208-218 (Jan.
23, 2014), available at http://www.pelob.gov/SiteAssets/Pages/default/PCLOB-Report-
on-the-Telephone-Records-Program.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB REPORT].
61 Charlie Savage, Obama to Callfor End to NSA 's Bulk Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2014, http://www.nytimes.Com/2014/03/25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-
data.html?_r=o.
62Id.
6 3 See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Reform, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
INFORMATION CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/reform/ (last visited Feb.
19. 2014); Jennifer Grannick, Reforming FISA: A Critical Look at the WydenlUdall
Proposal and Foreign Surveillance, CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, STANFORD LAW
SCHOOL, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/reforming-fisa-critical-look-
wydenudall-proposal-and-foreign-surveillance; Orin Kerr, A Proposal to Reform FISA
Court Decisionmaking, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 8, 2013),
http://wwv.volokh.COm/2013/07/o8/a-proposal-to-reform-fisa-court-decisionmaling/;
David Cole & Marty Lederman, Data-Mining, Section 215, and Regulating the
Government's Use of Stored Data: the Overlooked, but More Important, Question about
NSA Surveillance, JUST SECURITY (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://justsecurity.org/2o13/12/23/review-group-intelligence-communications-
technologies-bulk-data-collection-section-215/. See generally Category Archives: FISA:
Reform, LAWFARE BLOG, http://vwwv.lawfareblog.com/category/fisa/fisa-
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conversation has proceeded in a piecemeal fashion. The president's
proposal will thus become yet another bill for Congress to consider.
What has been missing from the discourse is a comprehensive
framework for how to think about potential reforms.64
If ever there were a time to re-think how to approach foreign
intelligence gathering in a blue-skies fashion, that time is now.
Technology has radically altered the landscape from both a threat
perspective and from the vantage of privacy and civil liberties. A
fragmented approach risks ignoring the potential effects of alterations
in the law and opportunities to create a sustainable structure. In
constructing such an approach, the first step is to consider how new
and emerging technologies have altered the environment in which we
now operate. This fundamentally shifts the conversation from a
historically-laden approach to one that begins from a different point
of analysis: namely, the technologies that now dominate the electronic
communications sphere.
III. THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY ON THE INFORMATION
RANGE AVAILABLE
The evolution of technology has had a profound impact on how
information is generated, transferred, and stored. New types of
information are now available. Novel analytical tools allow for the
generation of deeper insight into traditional and emerging forms of
information. Technology has also affected the geographic assumptions
underlying traditional foreign intelligence gathering (i.e., that a sharp
line can be drawn between domestic and international information
flows, with heightened protections afforded the former).
reform/#.UsGpoI5xKPc (highlighting posts by Lauren Bateman, Benjamin Wittes, Raffaela
Wakeman, Matt Danzer, Wells Bennett, Peter Margulies, Jack Goldsmith, Tim Edgar, Joel
Brenner, Sean Mirski, and others on the topic).
64 But see David Kris, Thoughts on a Blue-Sky Overhaul of Surveillance Laws:
Introduction, LAWFARE BLOG (May 18, 2013),
http://vwwv.lawfareblog.com/2o13/o5/thoughts-on- a-blue-sky-overhaul-of-surveillance-
laws-introduction/#.UsGoH45xKPc; David Kris, Thoughts on a Blue-Sky Overhaul of
Surveillance Laws: Challenges, LAWFARE BLOG (May 19, 2013),
http://vwwv.lawfareblog.com/2o13/o5/thoughts-on- a-blue-sky-overhaul-of-surveillance-
laws-challenges/#.UsGoY45xKPc; David Kris, Thoughts on a Blue-Sky Overhaul of
Surveillance Laws: Approach, LAWFARE BLOG (May 20, 2013),
http://vwwv.lawfareblog.com/2o13/o5/thoughts-on- a-blue-sky-overhaul-of-surveillance-
laws -approach/#.UsGzi45xKPc (3-part blog written prior to the Snowden releases, looking
at FISA reform, considering potential challenges to alterations to the current regime, and
contemplating possible future approaches).
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Overlaying the traditional design has been the creation of
additional protections afforded to U.S. persons. The problem is that
this approach assumes that the identity of the individual (a) is known;
and (b) can be closely aligned with the targeted information. New
technologies, however, allow for identity masking and anonymity, as
well as for the existence of significant amounts of information
dissociated at the front end from individual targets.
In considering potential changes to FISA, it is necessary to first
consider how one should think about new and emerging forms of
information, and the method by which such information is generated,
transmitted, and stored.
A. Types of Information
Consider first different types of information. At the most general
level, over the past four decades, the law has recognized three
principal areas: content, personally-identifiable information (PI), and
business records (including, inter alia, banking and financial records).
These categories have been provided with different levels of
protection.
The Supreme Court, for example, has traditionally applied a
higher level of protection to content and, in the context of third party
doctrine, a lower level of protection to customer records held by
companies. Accordingly, traditional FISA created a more stringent
regime for electronic communications or physical searches, wherein
content would be obtained, and a lower level of protection for the use
of pen registers and trap and trace devices.
As new technologies have emerged, particularly in a post-9/11
environment, there have been efforts to apply the rules accompanying
these categories to new areas. Developed in a different context,
though, such statutory requirements may be ill suited to the task. As a
result, institutional design may fail, courts may be unable to monitor
implementation, Congressional oversight may be lacking, and civil
liberties and privacy protections carefully considered in a different
context may be bypassed. Continued reliance on these categories also
risks masking the impact of emerging technologies on the evolution of
each category, as well as preventing recognition of the expansion in
the different types of information available.
In light of the current state of technology, it is thus worth
considering at least five categories of information that have emerged:
personal, transactional, relational, geolocational, and content-based.
(See Figure 1) A brief discussion helps to illustrate the distinction
between these areas.
The first category, personal information, relates to a single
individual whose identity can be obtained from the information itself,
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or from that information and other information that is in the
possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the person
controlling the information. Traditionally this category has included
information such as one's social security number, home address,
credit card number, health or medical records, insurance information,
and educational records. New technologies, however, have extended
this category to include areas like biometric identification markers
(e.g., facial recognition, DNA, and iris patterns), habit identification,
and pattern matching.
Figure 1
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thereto.The third category, relational information, has emerged as an
independent area as technology related to social network analysis has
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
evolved. Using both visual and mathematical tools, new technologies
allow individuals to map and to analyze various types of flows between
people, groups, organizations, geographic regions, computers, URLs,
and other connected entities. Relational information gives insight into
not just the existence of connections between individuals, but their
various roles and groupings within a network-i.e., who are the key
connectors, leaders, bridges, and isolates, where the key clusters are
and who comprises them, who is in the core of the network, and who
is on the periphery. Social network analysis yields additional insight
into the distribution of resources (both material and nonmaterial),
and potential constraints on individual actions.65
The fourth category, locational information, identifies the specific
physical location of an object or an individual. It thus relates to the
geography of the real world. Geolocational data in particular has come
to be associated with technologically-enhanced methods of
ascertaining physical placement (e.g., radar, GPS devices in
automobiles or mobile phones, or internet connections). This category
also incorporates the more traditional mode of ascertaining
individuals' locations-i.e., the simple observation of individuals in
public space.66
The fifth category, content, is perhaps the most traditional
category in its close association with both the First and Fourth
Amendments. Technology, however, has expanded the range of
materials that may provide what can be considered substantive
information. At the broadest level, content includes the substance of
communications, writings, and other materials. As a form of
communication, it conveys information through the exchange of ideas,
thoughts, or other information, such as through speech, writing, or
symbolic representations. It incorporates media content as well, such
as pictures, videos, auditory files, and writing. It thus relates to the
nature of individual experience.
65 For further discussion see STANLEY WASSERMAN AND KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS (1994).
66 Efforts to address the collection of this information have been introduced into Congress,
but no laws have yet been passed. See, e.g., Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S.
639, 113th Cong. (2013); see also H.R. 1312, 113th Cong. (2013); Geolocation Privacy and
Surveillance Act, S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011), see also Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance
Act, H.R. 2168, 112th Cong. (2011) (sponsored by Sen. Ron Wyden and Rep. Jason Chaffetz
in the House and Senate respectively). Online Communications and Geolocation
Protection Act, H.R. 983, 113th Cong. ( 2013) (introduced by Reps Zoe Lofgren (D-CA), Ted
Poe (R-TX), and Suzan DelBene (D-WA)). Location Privacy Protection Act of 2012, S.
1223, 113th Cong. (2012) (introduced by Sen. Al Franken (D-MN), passed the Senate
Judiciary Committee in Dec. 2012).
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Each of these categories has privacy interests associated with it
that are particular to that type of information. This suggests that
consideration of each category, sui generis, may be necessary to
construct the most appropriate structures to protect such privacy
interests. An added layer of complexity here is that the manner in
which such information presents in each category-i.e., the way it is
accessed, transmitted, or stored-differs.
B. Method ofAccess, Transmission, and Storage
Each of the different forms of information (personal,
transactional, relational, locational, and content) may be accessed,
transmitted, and stored in different ways. Some of these may be non-
digital, such as simply observing another's actions or reading a hand-
written letter. Others, such as accessing information held on a server,
may be technology-dependent. Simply extending the existing rules
from hard copy to hard drives, though, misses the enhanced privacy
implications of greater amounts of information and advanced back-
end analysis.67 Six categories here deserve notice: audio/visual (AV)
observation; communications networks; papers; hard drives (HD) and
device-specific storage; remote server/cloud technologies; and social
media. (See Figure 1)
The first category, A/V observation, is one of the most traditional
ways in which information is accessed. Under this approach,
information is obtained by observing a particular target or entity's
actions. Traditional modes of information collection in this area still
exist-this is the realm of placing a tail on a suspect in the law
enforcement world, or of HUMINT in the intelligence community. The
key point here is that technology has expanded the ways in which one
may be able to observe such actions. Electronic bugs represented one
of the early expansions. Placed in an individual's office or home, such
devices allow investigators or analysts to hear conversations that are
occurring within, thus giving them access to the content of
communications. Katz dealt with such an "amplifying device,"
attached to the outside of a phone booth. The Court recognized at the
67 For purposes of this paper, I understand data in a manner consistent with the Data
Protection Act, that is, information which: "(a) is being processed by means of equipment
operating automatically in response to instructions given for that purpose, (b) is recorded
with the intention that it should be processed by means of such equipment, (c) is recorded
as part of a relevant filing system or with the intention that it should form part of a relevant
filing system, (d) does not fall within paragraph (a), (b) or (c) but forms part of an
accessible record as defined by section 68, or (e) is recorded information held by a public
authority and does not fall within any of paragraphs (a) to (d)." Data Protection Act, 1998,
C. 29 (U.K.).
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time that new technologies applied to traditional areas could have a
deeper impact on the right to privacy.
Other types of technologies are similarly relevant to enhanced A/V
observation, and they cross informational categories. CCTV, for
instance, may allow for remote surveillance even where the
information obtained is not recorded. This extends beyond content
information to include locational data: individuals may be followed in
public space via traffic cameras, surveillance equipment on drones,
satellite cameras, or other technologies. Such tracking may similarly
reveal meetings, actions in the workplace, and social interactions-all
forms of relational information. Observations of commercial
exchanges, such as individuals shopping or withdrawing money from
the ATM, represent transactional information. And in the realm of
personal information, A/V observation may track individuals by
appearance (e.g., using facial recognition), or by license plate [e.g., via
automatic license-plate recognition (ALPR) or car plate recognition
(CPR) systems]. Such tracking through public space may identify
individuals' habits, their home address, their movements, and
common patterns in which they engage.68
The second category, communications networks, incorporates
wire, cable, and satellite communication systems. This is the realm of
electronic surveillance-which was one of the central areas addressed
by FISA in 1978. The purpose was to provide a heightened level of
protection for the content of individuals' communications. But
technology has progressed significantly beyond the telephone and
wire communications originally considered. Communications
networks may be accessed via telephones, computers, or other devices
that link up to the Internet. Content information may be conveyed
through telephone conversations, FaceTime, texts, emails, or voice
over Internet protocol (VOIP).
Much more than content is now involved in information carried
through communications networks. Locational data, such as GPS
transmissions, may be transferred. Relational data based on telephone
and internet content may yield insight into social networks.
Transactional information also may be conducted via automated
telephone systems: post-cut-through dialed digits (PCTDD) (numbers
dialed on a phone once a call has been put through) allow customers
to buy airline tickets, transfer money between accounts, and sell stock.
In the criminal law realm, efforts have been made to apply PRTT to
this area. The problem is that PCTDD also reveals content-suggesting
68 See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap and Constitutional Abyss:
Remote Biometric Identification Comes ofAge, 97 MINNESOTA L. REV. 407, 443 (2012).
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a deeper privacy interest than mere envelope information. 69 To the
extent that automated systems reveal personal data, such as social
security numbers (SSN), credit card or bank account numbers,
address information, and passwords (such as mother's maiden name,
place of birth, name of first pet), personal information is similarly
implicated.
Notably, neither of the first two categories (A/V observation and
communications networks) record what has historically been
considered content. Instead, they record process and movement.
Individual A goes to Place 1, then Place 2, and then Place 3; number X
dials number Y; or person A uses Credit Card Z. The recording of
process and movement is what generates information.
Critics of the bulk collection programs point to the generation of
information premised on structural connections, and the ability of the
government to amass this information in large quantities, at reduced
cost, and over extensive periods, to note the significant privacy
implication. It may also be prospective, which shifts the question from
how to access stored information or already-existing data, to how to
control access to information generated in this manner in the future.
The third category, papers, is the one most closely associated with
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-not least because of the wording
of the provision itself.7o Content information located in papers has
thus traditionally been afforded the highest level of protection. Since
obtaining one's letters, books, and writings, has generally required
entry into one's domicile, a warrant, or something approaching a
warrant in the realm of foreign intelligence, has typically been
required.
FISA, accordingly, includes within its auspices special provisions
for physical search that, along with electronic communications (also
content-based), are afforded the highest level of protection.
Lines between categories may, of course, be somewhat permeable.
The substance of one's papers may demonstrate an individual's
location at a particular time, such as via receipts. Relational
information may be ascertained from correspondence, and
transactional information from financial records. Simultaneously,
papers may provide personal information, such as one's
health/medical or educational records.
69 In the Matter of Applications of the United States of America for Orders (i) Authorizing
the Use of Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices and (2) Authorizing Release of
Subscriber Information, 515 F.Supp. 2d 325, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
70 To wit, "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures..." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Notably, scientific advances have deepened the type of
information that may be found in one's personal papers. DNA
technologies, for instance, may reveal a host of information about
individuals that was not previously knowable. But minimization
procedures have failed to account for the qualitative differences in
types of personal information obtained. Instead, they are rather
crudely based on whether an individual is a U.S. person or a non-U.S.
person.
The digitization of this information has not lessened the privacy
interests involved. If anything, its presentation in an analyzable
format has deepened the privacy implications. Simultaneously, the
increased volume of information means that much more about an
individual and his or her movements can be ascertained. Whereas
before an individual's prior location might be determined by a receipt,
mobile devices now include maps that can be queried for directions
and that archive all of the places on has travelled. Pictures taken on an
iPhone may include embedded data with the precise location at which
the image was snapped. To the extent that mobile devices reflect their
owner's actions (and not those of others who use or borrow the
device), they create a digital map of an individual's movements. Yet
the statute-and, indeed, the Court's jurisprudence-has failed to
acknowledge this equal, or deeper, privacy intrusion.
As a result, in the fourth category, hard drives and electronic
devices, we find varied application of the existing rules. This category
encompasses information held in electronic format on individual
electronic devices, as well as other forms of local storage, such as
memory sticks and stand-alone external hard drives. Content may
thus take a number of forms-e.g., documents, spreadsheets,
audio/visual files, and new code.71
Recent court documents suggest that there is confusion about
what level of protection to give to electronic devices in the face of
steadily expanding government capabilities. Confronted by requests
by the FBI to place malware on a suspect's computer and to access a
wide range of information held by the device in the course of an
investigation, for instance, district court judges have come out on
71 Early reports about law enforcement use of malware emerged in 2001 with discussion of
Magic Lantern. Bob Sullivan, FBI Software Cracks Encryption Wall, NBC NEWS.COM
(Nov. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.nbenews.com/id/3341694/ns/technology and science-security/t/fbi-
software-cracks-eneryption-wall/#.Uz4lo4V8qzB. The programs have since become
increasingly sophisticated.
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different sides of the issue.72 Network investigative techniques (NIT)
allow the FBI to covertly download files, photographs, and stored
emails, or even to activate cameras located on computers, allowing the
government to obtain real-time images.73 The privacy interests
involved in NIT are substantial. As the Ninth Circuit sitting en bane
recognized in U.S. v. Cotterman in the context of a border search of a
laptop:
The amount of private information carried by
international travelers was traditionally circumscribed
by the size of the traveler's luggage or automobile. That
is no longer the case. Electronic devices are capable of
storing warehouses full of information. The average
400-gigabyte laptop hard drive can store over 200
million pages-the equivalent of five floors of a typical
academic library.... Even a car full of packed suitcases
with sensitive documents cannot hold a candle to the
sheer, and ever-increasing, capacity of digital storage.7 4
Pari passu, the amount of information that can be obtained from any
individual's laptop is staggering. Recent media reports suggest that
the NSA has inserted malware into computer networks, as well as, like
the FBI, into individual computers, to collect information.75
72 Compare Third Amended Search and Seizure Warrant, No. 12-SW-05685 (D. Colo. Dec.
11, 2012); with Memorandum and Order, In Re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at
Premises Unknown, No. 4:13-MJ-00234 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22, 2013).
73 Craig Timberg & Ellen Nakashima, FBIs Searchfor 'Mo,'Suspect in Bomb Threats,
Highlights use of Malware for Surveillance, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/fbis-search-for-mo-suspect-in-
bomb-threats -highlights -use-of-malware-for-surveillance/ 2013/12/o6/352ba174-5397 -
1 e3-9e2c- edolll6fd98 story.html.
74 709 F.3d 952, 964 (2013).
75 See, e.g., Violet Blue, NSA Malware Infected Over 50,000 Computer Networks
Worldwide, ZD NET (Nov. 23, 2013), available at http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-malware-
infected-over-50000-computer-networks-worldwide-7000023537/; Andrea Peterson, The
NSA has its Own Team of Elite Hackers, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/o8/29/the-nsa-has-its-own-
team-of-elite-hackers/; Floor Boon, Steven Derix, and Huib Modderkolk, NSA Infected
50,000 Computer Networks with Malicious Software, NRC.NL (Nov. 23, 2013), available
at http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2o13/11/23/nsa-infected-5oooo-computer-networks-with-
malicious-software/; Raphael Satter, Report: NSA Intercepts Computer Deliveries, USA
TODAY, Dec. 29, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/12/29/report-
nsa-intercepts-computer-deliveries/4244181/.
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Simultaneously, the agency has compromised encryption technologies
by arranging for secret "back doors" to be built into software, by
making secret agreements with private companies, and by using
supercomputers to overcome barriers using brute force.76
The location of the devices in question, which is one of the
traditional ways to think about procuring foreign intelligence, seems
to be a minor matter, when compared to the privacy implications of
access to such broad swathes of data.
The fifth category, centered on server and cloud technologies,
recognizes that the same type of information that may be held on
individual devices may be stored on a remote server, such as IBM
Cloud, iCloud, Kindle Cloud, or Amazon Cloud. Some companies, such
as Dropbox, ZipCloud, SugarSync, and Google Gdrive, offer the ability
to store all data remotely, so that the information can be shared and
accessed at any time. Other companies, such as Livedrive, Mozy, and
BackupGenie, operate primarily as an online backup to individual
devices. Yet others, such as MyPCBackup and JustCloud offer both
services.
The cloud, though, does more than just offer ways to store
information. Cloud computing uses a network of remote servers
hosted on the Internet to manage and process data, extending these
functions beyond individual hard drives or personal devices. Because
of the sophistication of analytical techniques, the amount of storage
available, and the potential multi-sourcing of data involved, cloud
computing changes what individuals and companies can actually do.
It provides an opportunity for users to increase their capacity and to
add capabilities without extensive, new investments in infrastructure,
software, and personnel. And the market is exploding. As of July 2013,
for instance, approximately 30 public companies represented more
than $1oo billion in market capitalization and $12.5 billion in
estimated 2013 revenue.7
76 James Ball, Julian Borger, and Glenn Greenwald, Revealed: How US and UKSpy
Agencies Defeat Internet Privacy and Security, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 5, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2o13/sep/o5/nsa-gchq-eneryption-codes-security;
Jeff Larson, Nicole Perlroth, and Scott Shane, Revealed: The NSA's Secret Campaign to
Crack, Undermine Internet Security, PRO PUBLICA, Sept. 5, 2013,
http://www.propublica.org/article/the-nsas-secret-campaign-to-crack-undermine-
internet-encryption.
77 The top 15 cloud computing companies include Jife Software, Demandware, Fleetmatics,
RealPage, Dealertrack Technologies, Cornerstone OnDemand, Medidata Solutions, The
Ultimate Software Group, Athenahealth, Concur Technologies, ServiceNow, NetSuite,
Workday, Linkedln, and Salesforce.com. Julie Bort, The 15Most Valuable Cloud
Computing Companies in the World are Worth Way More Than You'd Think, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Jul. 29, 2013), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/the-15-most-
valuable-cloud-computing-companies-2013-7?op= 1.
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The same techniques that may be used to exploit hard drives and
individual, stand-alone electronic devices may be employed to obtain
content, as well as locational, relational, transactional, and personal
information, from remote servers. The amount of information
available-and insight into-the thoughts and actions of the target
may be significantly enhanced-not least because more information
can be uploaded and more powerful analytical software may be
marshaled in relation to the cloud. In addition, there are some
functions, such as online gaming, that are unique to the world of
servers in that they take place (in part) on servers located outside the
immediate electronic device. Efforts to communicate with others
inside the gaming world may be subject to interception with (under
traditional foreign intelligence provisions) little or no structure,
oversight, or control. Yet this, too, is a form of access to the content of
one's communications-an area traditionally afforded the highest, not
the lowest, level of protection to ensure that foreign intelligence
gathering comports with the Fourth Amendment.
The sixth category, social media, is a form of electronic
communication where users can create virtual communities to share
information, ideas, personal messages, photographs, videos, and other
data. Web sites like Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Instagram, and
Snapehat have become a critical form of networking and
microblogging. They cross different types of information categories,
simultaneously generating content, locational information, and
relational information. The companies hosting the sites, in turn,
maintain billing records, metadata, and other forms of transactional
information, even as they have access to a host of personally-
identifiable information about their account holders.
Each of these six categories, as it intersects with the five types of
information that now exist, present opportunities for agencies looking
to learn information about potential targets. Yet not all information is
equal: the substance and techniques employed may yield different
levels of value as well as different levels of insight into individuals'
private actions, thoughts, and beliefs.
From a value perspective, at one extreme, programs that fail to
provide meaningful intelligence in the manner anticipated, may be
voluntarily ended by the IC. According to James Clapper, for instance,
"[i]n December 2011, the Government decided not to seek
reauthorization of the bulk collection of Internet metadata." 8 ODNI
78 Declassification Press Release, supra note 1.
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explained, "the program was no longer meeting the operational
expectations that NSA had for it."79
Reliance, however, on the value of a program to the intelligence
agency involved for whether it will or will not operate would be
misplaced. Individuals who have insight into the program's extent
may disagree about its worth. The bulk collection of telephony
metadata, has been challenged by individuals on the Senate
Intelligence Committee, who have substantial access to the inner
workings of the program, on the grounds that it does not yield
significant benefits.8o But not all members of the committee-much
less officials in the agencies themselves-agree with that position.81
Regardless of how useful a program may be, underlying social,
political, and constitutional concerns remain. To the extent that the
different categories of information and related access, transmission,
and storage yield differing levels of confidential information, different
privacy interests come into play. Traditional models, based on, for
instance, geography (i.e., whether the object, device, or target is
located within US bounds or outside the country), rather miss the
point. It is thus crucial to build an expanded understanding of the
types of information in question into the statutory framework. These
categories fold into the proposed taxonomy, below.
IV. TAXONOMY FOR REFORM
An unsystematic approach to reforming FISA risks masking the
ways in which technology has altered the underlying landscape-
particularly assumptions built into the statute in 1978. It also imperils
the recognition of opportunities to respond more effectively to a
79 Additional Information on the Discontinued PR/TT Program, IC ON THE RECORD,
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 21, 2013),
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/tagged/declassified.
8o Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Senator Mark Udall (D-CO), for instance, both of
whom sit on the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, filed an amicus brief in November
2013 in First Unitarian Church v. NSA, asserting that they had "reviewed this surveillance
extensively and have seen no evidence that the bulk collection of Americans' phone records
has provided any intelligence of value that could not have been gathered through less
intrusive means." Motion of Senator Ron Wyden, Senator Mark Udall & Senator Martin
Heinrich to file a brief Amicus Curiae at 2, First Unitarian Church v. NSA, No. 13-3287
(N.D. Cal. 2013), available at https://www.eff.org/document/amici-brief-senators-wyden-
udall-heinrich.
81 See, e.g., Dianne Feinstein, The NSA's Watchfulness Protects America, WALL ST. J., Oct.
13, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI0001424o527o23o452o7o457912595o862794o5
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shifting threat environment, as well as ways in which these new
technologies carry with them unique incursions into civil liberties and
the Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Minor shifts in statutory
construction risk creating imbalance in institutional design. A system,
for instance, that is built on placing electronic intercepts on
traditional telephone lines may miss the importance of assigning a
science and technology expert to FISC in order to help the court to
understand new and emerging technologies. Similarly, geographic
emphasis may fail to take account of global information flows.
A systematic re-evaluation of foreign intelligence gathering has
not occurred since 1978. Statutory changes implemented in 1995,
1998, 2001, 2006, 2008, and 2011 failed to take a universal approach,
instead altering the statute in limited or tangential ways. 3 2 The most
significant changes expanded current sections or added new
provisions to the statute-such as the addition of business records in
1998 and their expansion in 2001 to tangible goods, or the inclusion of
Sections 702, 703, and 704 in 2oo8.83 These amendments did not
contemplate ways in which technology is changing how we should
think about foreign intelligence gathering writ large. They did not
consider the broader statutory design. And, for the most part, they did
not explicitly deal with new and emerging technologies.
For these reasons, a comprehensive taxonomy is helpful now for
thinking through changes that could be put into place. Where might
we start if, in light of current technologies, we were to begin
constructing a framework for foreign intelligence from the ground up?
This question puts some of the assumptions that undergird FISA back
on the table for discussion even as it introduces potentially new
approaches.
Structurally, the proposed taxonomy can be thought of in two
parts: a front-end and a back-end. The former framework deals with
the authority to collect information and the latter the implementation
of the authorities-i.e., the manner in which such information is
obtained, analyzed and used. Both frameworks sub-divide into two
sections that exist in equilibrium: the first deals with the positive
grant of authority, and the second with a check on the exercise of such
82 Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359, io8 Stat. 3423 (1994),
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112 Stat. 2396 (1998); USA
PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); USA PATRIOT Additional
Authorization Amendments Act of 2oo6, Pub. L. No. 109-178, 120 Stat. 278 (20o6); FISA
Amendments Act of 2oo8, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (20o8); FISA Sunsets
Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 112-3, 125 Stat. 5 (2011).
83 Id.
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powers. The latter thus balances the former, providing a counterpoise
to potential authorities.
Although the typology is designed to be cognizant of the need to
create avenues for the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence
information, as well as the need for protections on the exercise of
these authorities, it does not in and of itself take a position on where
these lines should be drawn. Instead, the purpose is to highlight the
types of provisions that could be taken on board in building a
comprehensive framework.
A. Front-End Framework to Collect Foreign Intelligence Information
Front-end considerations relate to the acquisition of information.
They divide into (1) the manner of collection, and (2) requirements for
approval of the authorities thereby created. (See Figure 2) The
structure thus reflects a positive grant of authority under certain
conditions (1), and structures to ensure that the appropriate processes
are followed prior to government entities acting on those powers (2).
While (2) thus acts primarily as a limitation on (1), it would be too
simplistic to say that each category only performs these functions. For
there are a number of ways in the sub-divisions in (1) could be
constructed to provide checks on the system. Nevertheless,
approaching the question in this manner allows for attention to be
drawn to the different functions of the relevant entities.
Figure 2
Front-End Framework to Collect Foreign Intelligence Information
Ma ner of Collection [ Requirements for Approval
1. Type of information
a. Content
b. Locational
c. Relational
d. Transactional
e. Personal
2. Method of access/transmission/storage
a. A/V (immediate observation)
b. Communications Technologies
c. Paper/tangible goods
d. HD/Device
e. Server/Cloud Technologies
f. Social media
3. Form in which information is transferred
a. Anonymization and re-identification
b. Prior screening by third party
4. Agency obtaining information
a. Broad institutional design (e.g..
1. Entity Approving Collection
a. Executive
- agency-internal
- agency-external
b. Judicial
- special court (e.g., FISC)
- ordinary Art. III court
- Art. I court
c. Other (e.g., private industry)
2. Construction of entity
a. Selection of decision-makers
- originating entity (e.g., Circuit
division, regional division, etc.)
- manner of selection (e.g., President,
Chief Justice, SCOTUS, Congress)
b. Length/progression of terms (period
of years, staggered terms, term limits)
c. Adversarial Drocesses
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NSA/CYBERCOM division)
b. Primary authorization (e.g., FBI, CIA,
NSA)
c. Concurrences req'd (e.g., AG, NSD)
5. Tariet
a. US v. non-US persons
b. Foreign powers/agents thereof
c. Terrorists (KSTs/Int'l)
6. Source of information
a. Private industry
- data retention requirements and costs
- voluntary v. compulsory compliance
- data security
- litigation risks
b. Third party data holders
- relationship to gov't, private entities
- division of information between entities
- data security.
- encryption keyholders (internal/external)
c. Government agencies
d. Non-governmental entities
e. International partners
- verification of information
7. Location of information
a. International v. domestic
b. Mixed (e.g., cyber)
c. Border
- Rights of challenge
- Rights of appeal
- Third party rights
- Constitutional advocate
d. Technological expertise
3. Scope of approval
a. Application format
b. Standards (e.g., particularized, RAS)
c. Duration
d. Renewal requirements
4. Verification
a. Third party data holder requirements
b. Encryption keyholder requirements
5. Emeriencv exceptions
a. Substantive requirements
b. Timeline for subsequent approval
c. Use of information
1. Manner of Collection
The first two considerations in the manner of collection center on
the type of information in question and the method of access thereto,
as well as the way in which such information is transmitted and
stored. Part III of this article has already considered these areas in
some depth. A short discussion will help to illustrate how using these
demarcations would significantly depart from the current orientation
of FISA, which relies on the target and the location of the information,
and help to construct a new approach to foreign intelligence.
Consider first the type of information. It may be personal and/or
transactional information (e.g., the association of particular credit
card numbers or billing records in relation to specific individuals)
should be considered in a category apart from relational information,
which in turn could be distinguished from locational or content-based
information.
In other words, the associated structures may depend upon the
type of information being sought. The number and types of entities
from whom personal and/or transactional information may be
2014]
IS: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
obtained, the process for obtaining the information, what information
may be retained, the manner and length of time of retention, and the
use of such provisions would then revolve around the information
itself, thus allowing the provisions to be tailored to the specific privacy
interest involved.
This approach allows for more careful consideration of the type of
information in question. For relational information, for instance, in
addition to the threshold issue, perhaps the most important question
is how to treat different levels of social connectedness-e.g., it may be
a lesser privacy intrusion to obtain information that an individual is a
member of an organization, than to look at relationships within
organizations to consider the role one plays within the entity.
Similarly, it may be that there are greater (or fewer) privacy interests
in building social networks of geographic regions versus looking at
individuals with similar political, economic, or religious subject-
matter-interests. The mere observation of individuals' involvement,
moreover, may be less intrusive than the digitization of such
information and the combination of such data with other
information-suggesting heightened privacy protections as one moves
outward along the digitization axis (see Figure 1).
To the extent that locational information reveals substantive data,
perhaps it should be placed within a framework similar to content-
based approaches. Again, the outward movement along the
digitization axis may trigger further protections as the data changes
form or is incorporated into recombinant systems (i.e., systems that
combine data with other information that allows the user a greater
level of insight into individuals' private lives).
Beyond the first two categories (the type of information, and the
method of access, transmission, or storage), the manner of collection
may be constructed with reference to five further areas. First, the form
in which information is transferred may be considered as part of the
front-end collection. The data, for instance, may be anonymized
before it is provided to the government agency, with only certain data
points meeting a pre-set selection criteria then subjected to re-
identification.8 Alternatively, a third party data-holder may pre-
screen the results of any searches. Thus, for instance, if a search
returns 400 numbers, those relating to non-concerning entities could
be screened out prior to government examination of the data.
Second, contours may be built around access to information based
on the agency obtaining the information. This, in turn, has three
components: (a) broad institutional design [e.g., deciding to separate
84 But see Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701 (2010).
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NSA/CYBERCOM or requiring civilian personnel to head particular
agencies], (b) primary authorization [e.g., authorizing the FBI but
preventing the CIA (as in Exec. Order 12333) from engaging in certain
activities], and (c) concurrences required [e.g., requiring the Attorney
General or the Assistant Attorney General of the National Security
Division to sign off on applications to obtain information].
The third consideration is the target about whom information is
sought. Traditionally, FISA has focused on U.S. versus non-U.S.
persons, presenting higher barriers to collection of information on the
former, versus the latter. It has overlaid this with two additional
categories-namely, whether individuals are foreign powers or agents
thereof, or involved in international terrorism. These categories are
decidedly individual, requiring a nexus between the target of the
information and the category. Discussion thus may turn on the level of
suspicion required to collect information related to a target, for
instance requiring a statement of facts supporting reasonable,
articulable suspicion. (Note that one would then expect parity between
this and the scope of approval, addressed, below).
A fourth, associated area may be the source of the information
itself. FISA has only tangentially considered this in relation to
business records and, subsequently, tangible goods. But there are
numerous sources that could be considered. Private industry may
generate and/or store information. Different approaches that could be
taken here include possibly introducing data retention requirements,
which gives rise to considerations of cost. Data security prior to
government access could be statutorily addressed. Attention also
could be drawn to voluntary versus compulsory compliance and
associated risks of litigation borne by the companies. Alternatively,
reform efforts may want to focus on constructing new, third-party
data holders, which may be linked in some way either to government
or to industry-or to neither. Under this approach, further thought
may be given to dividing information between entities for additional
protection of data. In this case, the security of the data would also be
relevant, as would the potential for introducing yet another third party
in the form of encryption key holders-the purpose of which is to
divide the process via which the information is accessed.85 Encryption
key holders may also be built into the independent entity holding the
data, much like an Inspector General office is part of the institutional
framework of a government entity.
Information may also be obtained from other government
agencies, in which case interim Memorandum of Understanding,
85 But see Scott D. Sagan, The Problem of the Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear
Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security, 24 RISKANALYSIS 935 (2004).
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standards, and procedures will have to be taken into consideration, or
it may be derived from non-governmental entities. If obtained from
international partners, further verification of the information may be
required. If this is the favored approach, the type of framing used
alters. For example, lower levels of reliance may be assumed when
information comes from foreign entities, in relation to which the U.S.
has limited control, suggesting greater minimization procedures until
information is verified. Alternatively, to protect other agencies'
missions, it may suggest limiting intra-governmental transfer of
information; additionally, in the interests of privacy, it may mean
creating higher barriers to obtaining information from a target's
employer, requiring a higher showing before a neutral arbiter before
obtaining certain records.
The fifth additional area associated with the manner of collection
is location. Traditionally, FISA has considered international versus
domestic. But the possibility of having a mixed category (e.g., where
information flows across borders), or one focused on the border itself
may sharpen the analysis.
2. Requirements for Approval
Having considered the manner of collection, attention then turns
to checks on these authorities in the form of what is required for
approval prior to the collection of the information-essentially, the
process that must be followed in order for collection to commence.
Here, there are four principal considerations: the entity(ies)
approving the collection, how that entity is constructed, what the
scope of the approval is, and emergency exceptions. Underlying this
demarcation is the time-honored understanding that having a neutral
arbiter provides an important check on the exercise of authority.
The entity approving collection may be one of three forms. Within
the executive branch, it may be internal or external to the intelligence
agency that has been authorized to collect the data. In the judicial
realm, there are three types of arbiters that may be constructed: a
special court (like FISC), an ordinary Article III court, or an Article I
court. There may, in addition, be a way to construct a board or
independent arbiter from other sources, such as private industry or
quasi-governmental organizations.
The construction of the entity itself also offers numerous options.
The manner in which decision-makers are selected may include
requirements with regard to the originating entity (for instance
requiring a division among certain circuits, regions, or types of
industry), as well as the manner of selection (e.g., by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, by members of the Supreme Court, by the Appellate
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Courts, or by particular committees in Congress). The length of the
terms, or their progression (e.g., the period of years, staggered terms,
and term limits) may also be considered. Adversarial processes, in
turn, may involve rights of challenge to the orders, rights of appeal,
third party rights, or the creation of a constitutional advocate, while
technological expertise similarly may be built into the statutory
design.
The scope of approval contributes further to the potential
requirements that must be met prior to acquisition of information.
This category highlights the form that the application or request must
take, standards that the entity must follow in approving or
disapproving of the applications, the duration for which applications
may be granted, and the contours of any requirements for renewal.
Although not currently required under the statute, depending
upon the final form of data storage and access, it may be desirable to
include an additional verification stage-i.e., requirements that must
be met by certain actors in verifying that the requesting agency has
gone through the appropriate steps. These may apply to third party
data holders, such as telecommunications companies, or independent
entities established for the purpose of holding the data for intelligence
purposes. It may be equally relevant for encryption key holders, prior
to allowing access to the information.
A final area to highlight relates to emergency exceptions that could
be constructed to take account of national security crises. Three
principal areas (substantive requirements, the timeline for subsequent
approval, and the subsequent use of information obtained during the
exercise of the emergency provisions) provide the focus. Taken
together, these various approaches suggest a more comprehensive
view of ways to provide access to new types of information.
B. Back-End Framework to Analyze and Use Foreign Intelligence
Information
Like front-end considerations, a range of categories could be used
to explore the construction of a back-end framework centered on
implementation of the authorities thereby granted. This framework
also divides into two parts, reflective of the positive grant of authority
and subsequent checks on the same powers, even as considerations
within each category may consider both aspects as well. These realms
relate to implementation, on the one hand, and transparency and
oversight, on the other. (See Figure 3)
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Figure 3
Back-End Framework to Analyze
Information
and Use Foreign Intelligence
Implementation
1. Analysis
a. Raw data
- type of analysis (e.g., data mining, social
network analyses)
- levels of analysis (e.g., primary, secondary,
tertiary)
- requisite standards and processes to be
followed
b. Recombinant information
- substantive (e.g., biometric v. biographic)
- programmatic (e.g., Sec. 215/Sec. 702)
- source (e.g., intra-agency and inter-agency;
government and private databases)
c. Verification
2. Use
a. Minimization
b. Judicial processes (e.g., prosecution, use of
information as evidence in trial, etc.)
c. Consequential actions (e.g., further
targeting, watch listing, etc.)
3. Retention
a. Length of time
b. Who holds the information (e.g., NSA,
FBI, DNI, CIA)
c. How is the information held (e.g., digital v.
hard copy, combined with PH1 or other data
v. isolated)
d. Access (e.g., which individuals within
agency, which agencies, under what
conditions)
4. Transfer
a. To whom
b. Restrictions on use, access, and sharing
c. Verification
Trausparency and Oversight
1. Who reports
a. Agency executing foreign intelligence
authorities
b. IC entity's Inspector General
-Administrative (e.g., NSA, NGA, NRO
IGs)
- Statutory (e.g., CIA IG, DOJ IG)
c. IC entity's privacy officer
d. Concurrence entity (e.g., NSD)
e. Approval entity (e.g., FISC)
f. External Agencies (e.g., ODNI, OMB)
g. Entities providing the information to the
IC (e.g., private sector, NGOs)
h. Independent oversight body (e.g.,
PCLOB)
2. What is reported
a. Execution of authorities (e.g., #/range of
orders, programs, benefits/rates of success)
b. Application under the law (e.g., novel or
significant legal interpretations,
application to new technologies)
c. Noncompliance (willful and non-willful)
d. Non-standard (specifically requested)
information
3. To whom report
a. Head of agency executing foreign
intelligence authorities
b. IC entity's IG or privacy officer
c. Concurrence entity
d. Approval entity
e. External agencies
f. Independent bodies (e.g., PCLOB)
g. Congressional committees
h. Public
4. Penalties for violations
a. Administrative (e.g., reprimand, loss of
security clearance, suspension,
termination)
b. Civil (e.g., fines)
c. Criminal (e.g., prison)
5. Alternative reportin2 channels
a. fraud, waste, abuse (programmatic)
-path (agency, supervisor, ODNI,
Congress)
-protections against recrimination
b. Public interest (systemic)
- external body
- criminal defense (ex post v. ex ante)
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1. Implementation
Implementation centers on how the authorities granted to the
intelligence community are actually used. There are four categories to
consider: analysis, use, retention, and transfer. Traditionally,
emphasis has only been placed on the second and third areas and,
even within these, on only a few components (e.g., minimization
procedures and the length of time data is retained). The taxonomy
thus allows more careful scrutiny of different aspects of the
implementation phase and expands the ways in which Congress could
approach each area.
Under analysis, for instance, a new foreign intelligence framework
could focus on how raw data is treated. Emphasis on the type of
analysis, such as what sorts of data mining or social network analyses
can be performed could be considered, as well as levels of analysis
(e.g., primary, secondary, and tertiary "hops"). Attention may be
drawn to the requisite standards and processes to be adopted prior to
progressing from one stage to the next.
Consideration could also focus on what I call "recombinant
information"-namely, the combining of information from different
sources in a way that generates new knowledge. Attention can be paid
to combining substantively distinct information, such as biometric
and biographic data. It may center on programmatic combinations.
For instance, agencies may want to combine information from
different programs run under the same legal authorities (e.g., Section
215), or from programs run under different legal authorities (e.g.,
Sections 215 and 702). Alternatively, agencies may want to combine
databases held in different areas of the agency with databases held
outside the agency, or government databases with publicly-available
databases. Another consideration in looking at the analysis of the data
centers on information verification. This becomes particularly
important when subsequent intrusions into civil liberties and
individual privacy may flow from the initial analyses. This approach
would help to highlight new and emerging ways in which data analysis
is progressing.
The use of such information also presents an opportunity for
statutory construction. Minimization procedures have historically
been considered (and still offer) an opportunity for further inspection.
But prosecutorial limits, the use of such evidence in trial, and other
judicial process-related concerns may be taken on board, as well as
the extent to which consequences that follow from initial analyses,
such as further targeting or watch listing, raise civil liberties concerns.
Retention has historically been limited to considerations about
time, but there are other questions that could also be statutorily
addressed. Once obtained (and not just at the outset), who should
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hold the information? Should it be held by the NSA? The FBI? The
CIA? Different government entities have different missions, and so the
placement of the data is of consequence. Beyond the entity
responsible for the data, how is the information being held? It may be
in digital form or hard copy. It may be combined with other data or
personal identifiers, or it may be isolated. Additionally, access may be
considered-not just who has access within the intelligence agency in
question (e.g., on a need to know basis, by level of clearance, or by
programmatic assignment), but which other agencies have access to
the information as well.
The final consideration relates to transferring the data. This
incorporates the recipient of the information, further restrictions on
use, access, and sharing, and ways in which the information may be
verified in the future.
Figure 4
Transparency and Reportng
Within the Executive Branch
2. Transparency and Reporting
The flip side of the design for implementing the authorities
granted to the intelligence community is considering how such use is
to be monitored. As with requirements for approval at the front end,
this area acts as a counterpoise, balancing the power to collect foreign
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intelligence with protections to prevent improper use of the same. It
subdivides into five primary considerations: who reports, what is
reported, to whom the report is made, penalties for violations, and
alternative reporting channels.
The first area, who reports, incorporates entities internal and
external to the entity exercising the authorities. A good way to think
about this area is in terms of concentric circles. (See Figure 4) In the
core, the specific agency engaged in foreign intelligence collection may
be required to report. One level out, the IC entity's inspector general
may be brought on board. Of relevance is the underlying structure of
this position-i.e., either administrative (e.g., the current IGs of the
NSA, NGIA, and NRO), or statutorily required (e.g., the current IGs of
the CIA and DOJ). Additional consideration can be given to reporting
requirements to the IC entity's privacy officer. The next ring includes
any entities required for concurrence at the front-end application or
initiation, such as DOJ's National Security Division. The adjoining
circle incorporates any entity required for approval of the intelligence
gathering. This may be FISC, or some other entity created for the
purpose of addressing the counterpoise to the front-end
considerations. The following band includes external agencies, which
perform oversight within the executive branch, such as ODNI, or
OMB. The abutting loop focuses on entities that provide information
to the IC-such as the private sector or NGOs. On the outermost ring
we then find independent oversight bodies, such as the PCLOB.
The question of who reports folds then into the second area, which
is what is reported. Entities may be required to report on the
execution of authorities (e.g., the number and range of orders,
programs underway, and benefits or rates of success). They may
address how the programs have been applied under the law, detailing
novel or significant legal interpretations, or the extension of prior
legal analysis to new technologies. Noncompliance requirements
(either willful or non-willful) are included here. Finally, of importance
will be the manner in which non-standard (specifically requested)
information will be handled.
Having looked at who reports and what is reported, the third area
to consider is to whom such information is made available. For logical
reasons, the potential list of recipients is to some measure co-extent
with the entities considered for who makes the report (to ensure
access to information necessary for them to fulfill their statutory
duties). But there are some differences. Thus, reports may be required
under certain circumstances to (a) the head of the agency executing
the foreign intelligence authorities, (b) the entity's inspector general
or privacy officer, (c) the concurring entity, (d) the approval entity, (e)
other executive branch agencies, or (f) independent bodies. In
addition, (g) Congress, and (h) the public may also be considered for
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receiving reports from the various reporting bodies. While the latter
reports would necessarily be unclassified, the reports to the preceding
areas [(a)-(g)] may be either classified or unclassified.
Crossing the first three categories are questions related to the
burden such reporting may place on the agencies involved, in terms of
time, personnel, and money. Special appropriations may be made, for
instance, to account for the need to develop new technologies to allow
for auditing programs, or to hire additional analysts to act in an
internal capacity. Alternatively, consideration of reporting
requirements as a whole may help to streamline the overall process.
The fourth consideration in transparency and oversight focuses on
what to do about misuse of authorities. Penalties for violations may
include administrative measures, such as reprimands, loss of security
clearances, suspension, or termination. Civil remedies such as fines
may be created, or criminal measures may be attached.
The fifth and final consideration focuses on what to do when the
regular reporting channels are not working. How should one conceive
of alternative reporting channels? Here, there appear to be two
divisions. The first, relating to fraud, waste, and abuse, tends to be
programmatic in that it focuses on specific programs in place.
Questions to address include (a) the path that individuals concerned
about fraud, waste, and abuse should follow (e.g., within the agency,
relating to supervisors, going to ODNI, or approaching Congress), as
well as (b) protections against recrimination. The second division
emphasizes public interest-representing a systemic (not a
programmatic) concern about the exercise of foreign intelligence
gathering authorities. Here, attention may be paid to the role of
external bodies as well as potential criminal defenses available in the
event that the matter goes to trial (ex post v. ex ante considerations).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Public knowledge of PSP has generated widespread calls for FISA
reform. Proponents of change point to the general approach adopted
by Congress in passing FISA, the statutory language itself, and Fourth
and First Amendment constitutional concerns as a basis for
introducing alterations.
The trouble with many of the proposals is that they fail to adopt a
fresh start to the question of foreign intelligence, instead, looking for
fixes to specific problems. The quandary, however, is much bigger
than, for instance, the lack of adversarial counsel, or the five year
retention of data by the NSA. The problem is that technology has
radically altered, and the approach on which FISA rests, centered on
targets and geography, is now woefully inadequate for the world in
which we now live.
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It is for this reason that this Article has sought to look at how
technology itself has altered since 1978, in terms of the types of
information that are now available (i.e., personal, transactional,
relational, locational, and content) and in the methods by which such
information can be accessed, transmitted, and stored (namely,
observation, communications networks, papers, hard drives and
stand-alone devices, remote servers and cloud technologies, and social
media).
Using these divisions as a basis for the first part of the front-end
framework, the proposed taxonomy builds on them to add
considerations related to the form in which such information is
transferred, the agency seeking the information, the target about
whom information is sought, and the source and location of
information. Set against the manner of collection at the front-end, are
the requirements for approval. Here, the entity approving the
collection, the construction of that entity, the scope of the approval to
be granted, potential verification regimes, and exceptions in times of
emergency may be considered.
For the back-end framework to analyze and use foreign
intelligence information, implementation divides into four primary
areas: analysis, use, retention, and transfer. The check on these
authorities primarily takes the form of transparency and oversight,
which further subdivided into five areas: who reports, what is
reported, to whom they report, penalties for violations, and alternative
reporting channels.
While the taxonomy does not represent a radical reconception of
intelligence collection, it does expand the scope of the current reform
efforts addressed in Part II to include the range of potential areas that
could be brought on board. In doing so, it builds on the country's
experience over the past 36 years even as it recognizes changed
circumstances. Although the Article takes no normative position on
the specific reforms to be given effect, it clarifies areas critical for
discussion and, in so doing, their complex relationship with other
elements in the framework. The hope is that the taxonomy may serve
as a way to move the conversation forward in developing an approach
to foreign intelligence gathering that is cognizant of the need to obtain
foreign intelligence, even as it recognizes the changing privacy
interests implicated by new and emerging technologies.
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